Forecast · commercial outlook

The five-year commercial case for the whole hotel.

This page walks the upfront capital needed to build the venture, the working capital required to bridge to break-even, and where revenue is projected to come from across the five-year horizon. Scope: the whole hotel — renovation is for the entire property (all 72 suites, all guest-facing spaces), not just the programme wing, so the forecast covers the hotel's full P&L rather than the programme layer in isolation. Base hotel operations (non-programme rooms, retail spa, existing F&B) sit alongside the new programme revenue as first-class lines in the model. The interactive utilisation sliders let the reader stress-test any assumption. Detail on each cost and revenue line sits on the specific page for that line — Renovation, Equipment, Staff, Programmes — and is not duplicated here.

Prepared for the hotel's board, and for any advisor or bank partner reviewing the proposition. The underlying commercial model is available as an Excel file on request. Cost lines are anchored to the FY2025 management accounts for Hotel de France (Jersey) Limited — the baseline section immediately below sets out that starting position in full.

Baseline · the 2025 accounts

Where we start. £5.40M income, £82,692 profit before tax.

Every cost line in the forecast below is anchored to the year ended 31 December 2025 for Hotel de France (Jersey) Limited, rather than to estimates. This is the honest starting position, and it is the strongest single argument for the proposition: the hotel turned £5.40M of income into £82,692 of pre-tax profit — a margin of 1.5%, against a budget of £525,890 and a prior year of £385,005. The existing model is running out of road, and the case for change does not depend on optimism about the new one.

FY2025 actual	Actual	Budget	Prior year
Accommodationacross the current 129 rooms — corporate, tour operator, extranet, F.I.T	£2,510,697	£3,550,051	£2,973,427
Food & beverageLa Terrasse and Kitchen — bar £268,178, food £960,255	£1,228,432	£1,466,743	£1,219,109
Sundry incomesundry sales £901,667, misc. sales £743,405, room hire £10,710 — the largest single block after rooms, and the one needing the clearest breakdown for a lender	£1,657,859	£1,642,155	£1,529,045
Total income	£5,396,988	£6,658,949	£5,721,581
Cost of sales	(£628,927)	(£736,222)	(£644,328)
Staff costswages £2,644,610 + social security £178,082 + casual £39,082 + staff meals £45,500 + training £21,326 + property rent £26,201 + recruitment £6,078 + uniform £1,926	(£2,962,804)	(£3,294,901)	(£2,917,956)
Utilitieselectricity £146,788 · gas £166,324 · heating oil £33,733 · water £25,778	(£372,622)	(£439,466)	(£389,785)
Other operating costslaundry & dry cleaning £166,277, department supplies £98,479, cleaning supplies £24,410, flowers, garden, entertainment	(£364,240)	(£424,240)	(£348,543)
Operating profit	£1,068,395	£1,764,120	£1,420,969
Non-operating incomestaff rent received £258,540 + misc. receipts £444,997	£703,538	£727,027	£610,262
Non-operating expensesfinancial £664,805 (of which bank interest £505,220) · administrative £391,343 · repairs £219,650 · depreciation £194,280 · renewal £129,083 · marketing £90,080	(£1,689,241)	(£1,965,257)	(£1,646,226)
Profit before taxation	£82,692	£525,890	£385,005

What the 2025 accounts tell us

Rooms are the problem, and rooms are the fix. Accommodation fell £462,730 year on year (£2.97M → £2.51M, −15.6%) and missed budget by £1.04M. Against 129 rooms that is a RevPAR of £53. The current proposition is losing pricing power in a market that has not shrunk — which is precisely the case for repositioning rather than defending.
F&B is loss-making. The La Terrasse and Kitchen department returned a pre-tax loss of £10,830 on £1,235,401 of income, against a £44,417 profit the year before. Departmental staff costs ran at 66% of departmental income (wages alone 60%) against an industry norm of 30-35%. Ahara does not just need a new menu — it needs a labour model that works.
The wage-bill baseline is confirmed. Total staff costs of £2,962,804 land within 0.3% of the Staff page figure of £2,972,529 built bottom-up from 85 positions. The forward plan is therefore standing on a verified base, not an estimate.
Interest already consumes the profit. Bank interest of £505,220 and total financial expenses of £664,805 exceed pre-tax profit eight times over. Any capital structure for the raise has to be assessed against a business whose current pre-tax margin is 1.5% — see the finance-cost line in the P&L below, which is no longer held flat.
Sundry income has now been unpacked. At £1,657,859 it is 31% of total income — larger than F&B — and previously sat behind two aggregate ledger codes (sundry sales £901,667, misc. sales £743,405). Ryan has since supplied the line-item breakdown — Spa treatments £886,804 anchors Sundry Sales; Healthhaus cross-charge £694,849 anchors Misc Sales. Full breakdown in the status panel immediately below and in the 2025 Actuals tab of the downloadable workbook.

Data status · from Ryan LeCouteur, Finance Director

Aggregate codes broken down and recurring/one-off flagged

Ryan has supplied the aggregate-code breakdown (Priority 1) and the recurring / non-recurring analysis (Priority 2). The two blocks that previously sat behind aggregate ledger codes — Sundry Sales £901,667 and Misc. Sales £743,405 — now reconcile to line item. The 2025 Actuals tab in the downloadable workbook holds his full itemisation as the anchoring reference the forecast projects from. Payroll by department (Priority 3) is in progress.

Priority 1 — RESOLVED · aggregate codes broken to line item

Sundry Sales £901,667 → Spa treatments £886,804 (the anchor, ~98% of the code); 20% Service Charge Admin £10,392; Tray Charge (room service) £4,190; Reception Sundry £281.
Misc Sales £743,405 → Healthhaus cross-charge £694,849 (recurring commercial charge for HH members using the pool and facilities — not a rental agreement); expired vouchers written off £35,201; HH admin fee £6,648; staff wash tokens £4,241; coffee bar £2,246; staff WiFi £220.
Misc Receipts £444,997 → Lido management fee £243,471; rental income £149,948 (split at line-item level below); Healthhaus loan interest £41,686; car park £8,491; other £1,401.
Staff rent received £258,540 — treated as trading income for Jersey tax.

Impact on the forecast. Ayush spa Y1 baseline re-anchored £500k → £887k (spa treatments actual). Voucher write-off added as a new recurring revenue line at £40-50k/yr. Healthhaus £280k Y2+ line intentionally left unchanged — post-restructure, the property rent goes to HdF Group Ltd; The Long Hotel receives only the capped facility-use amount for HH members. Everything else already sits within the modelled aggregate totals.

Priority 2 — RESOLVED · recurring versus one-off flagged

Recurring, with inflationary increase:

All of Sundry Sales; all of Misc Sales (voucher write-off is technically discretionary in timing but has been consistently 7.5-12.5% of ~£415k/yr voucher sales — treated as recurring).
Bonita hairdresser £35,126 (9-yr lease from Mar 2019, expires Feb 2028, 3-yr rent reviews); JT phone mast £6,660; Westview apartments £82,610 (potential £95k at full occupancy); Healthhaus loan interest £41,686 (6.5% on ~£740k balance); car park £8,491.
Lido management fee £243,471 — 20% of gross Lido rental income, HMRC-agreed related-party structure. Lido gross rental sits in a different entity and is already discounted from HdF trading figures.

Non-recurring (short leases):

Dynamic Health £17,646 in 2025 / £30,250 FY2026 — 1-yr lease from Sep 2025, expires Aug 2026 (extension of at least 3 months being discussed).
MacMillan Cancer £7,906 in 2025 / £30,250 FY2026 — 2-yr lease from Dec 2025, expires Dec 2027.

ERM confirmation: the ~£400k Elinor Ruth Medical Centre tenant income does not sit inside Misc Receipts. Ryan's rental line reconciles to £149,948 across Bonita / Dynamic Health / MacMillan / JT phone mast / Westview only. ERM tenant income is recorded elsewhere in the group and stays with HdF Group Ltd — confirmed exclusion from The Long Hotel P&L, as the forecast already assumes.

Priority 3 — OUTSTANDING · Ryan collating from source documents

Payroll by department. Split of the £2,644,610 wage bill across Kitchen, La Terrasse, Housekeeping, Front Office and Spa. Once received, the Ayush departmental table below moves from partially derived (£420k estimated wage) to fully sourced.
Agency commission £227,047 split by channel — extranet versus tour operator versus other. The plan assumes exiting OTA and wholesale distribution removes most of this cost alongside the revenue, and that assumption is currently inferred from the ~19% ratio rather than confirmed.
Electricity in kWh, not just £. The clinic load modelling on this page works in cash terms only, which conflates consumption with tariff. Consumption data would let us separate the two — and would tell us whether the incoming supply has headroom for the clinic, gym and cryotherapy chamber, or whether a supply upgrade is a capex line we have not yet costed.
Accommodation by channel with room-nights and ADR, not revenue alone. The channel decomposition further down this page rests on revenue splits; room-nights and rate would let us verify the RevPAR and occupancy assumptions directly rather than inferring them.

Priorities 1 and 2 have moved this page from derived to sourced on its single largest soft spot. Priority 3 is what we would need before a bank meeting rather than before the next board discussion — Ryan is collating it now.

One · upfront capex

Upfront capex. £11.82M – £18.11M across four categories.

One-off spend on the physical build, the clinical and wellness equipment, the pre-launch content library, and a portfolio contingency reserve. Each category is costed and detailed on its own page; this table is the roll-up. The range reflects the spread between the leaner scope and the fuller premium scope on each line — not uncertainty about the scope itself. All line-item detail, breakdown assumptions, and vendor-level pricing sits on the linked pages.

Category	What it covers	Amount
Renovation Physical build	The 129→72 suite consolidation (of which 15 South Wing units carry a kitchenette fit-out for corporate long-stay use, +~£200k), spa treatment-room expansion (8→10 rooms), Ahara restaurant renovation, main hotel reception, wellness reception, lobby cafe, ground- and first-floor corridors, Bala Gym fit-out, plus signage and wayfinding. Range spans leaner scope through to full premium finishes across all guest-facing spaces. Includes the Kala artist workshop room build (~£100-180k) when the artist-in-residence toggle above is on — unticking that toggle removes Kala from the totals below.	£10.02M – £15.37M
Equipment Clinical + wellness kit	The Sama Clinic stack (DEXA scanner, phlebotomy fit-out, Kanti aesthetic suite, Kaya assessment room, VISIA, Vald ForceDecks Mini single-plate [£3-5k, downgraded from the earlier Hawkin dual-plate spec], Theia3D markerless motion capture [£15-25k — 4-6 cameras + software], Biosen C-Line blood-lactate analyser [£3.5-5k for Vikrama Focus VO₂+lactate profiling], 12-lead resting ECG [£2.5-4k — Welch Allyn CP150 / Mortara ELI 250c / Schiller AT-102 Plus for every longevity intake], AcuPebble, bioimpedance), 8× iPad Air 13" concierge-loan tablet pool [~£11k — deliberate TV substitute for the 57 wellness suites, MDM-supervised kiosk mode, guests sign into their own streaming accounts, wiped on return], Bala Gym equipment, cryotherapy chamber and LN2 infrastructure, Aruna LED panels (Phase 03), Orion beds across all 72 suites, Philips AC2729/10 2000i Series 2-in-1 (HEPA + evaporative humidifier) across all 72 suites (£23-30k — CADR 250 m³/h purification, 500 mL/hr humidification from a 3.5L tank, Clean Home+ app, single-vendor consolidation on the Philips order). Plus per-suite Organic Aromas Raindrop nebulizing aromatherapy diffusers (£7-8k — hand-blown glass, 4 fixed-pipette dropper bottles of curated evening oils per suite; guest chooses their bedtime scent, housekeeping refills from bulk trade-grade oil stock). Plus enterprise WiFi mesh foundation (£22-35k — 24-36 ceiling-mount APs with per-room VLAN isolation + central controller; Phase 03 in-suite control panels + software integration deferred to a separate ~£65-160k scope once operational data confirms guest UX preferences). Also includes the Siksa fermentation-classroom furniture and teaching kit (~£5-11k). Includes the Kala live-stream AV + furniture (~£25-50k — 2× PTZ cameras, hardware encoder, distributed speakers, wireless and ceiling mics, bean bags, foldable chairs) when the artist-in-residence toggle is on.	£542k – £902k
Launch content & software Pre-launch investment	Brand-identity finalisation, website design and build, professional photography, evergreen video library, guest companion app MVP build (itinerary, wayfinding, results inbox), Terra sleep integration. Treated as capex rather than Y1 marketing expense because the assets are durable across 12-18 months of marketing activity.	£187k
Portfolio reserve Scope-creep contingency	10% ring-fenced reserve held over and above the line-item contingencies already baked into renovation (10-15%) and equipment. Covers cross-cutting unknowns: scope creep spanning multiple lines, late-discovered issues requiring entirely new lines, sequencing rework, emergent regulatory or operational requirements. Released only against documented overrun, not absorbed into base scope.	£1.07M – £1.65M
Total upfront capex	Full four-category roll-up. Working capital is a separate line — see below.	£11.82M – £18.11Mincl. driveway paving estimate — contractor quote pending — kitchenette fit-out for 15 corporate long-stay studios — and four-lift programme (spa + main × 2 replaced, south refurbished)

Detail on every line sits on the linked pages above. Renovation runs across 2-3 years; equipment and software land alongside the physical build as spaces become ready. The full £11.82M-£18.11M (includes the indicative driveway paving estimate — specialist paving contractor quote pending) is not called in month one — drawdown matches the build sequence.

Two · working capital

Working capital. +£1.57M / year net incremental wage bill.

The workforce plan on the Staff page moves the fully-loaded wage bill from ~£2.97M/year today to ~£4.47M/year forward — a net incremental cost of +£1.57M per year. That number is working capital, not capex — it is a persistent operating cost the venture carries every year the hotel operates, distinct from the one-off renovation and equipment spend above.

Verified against the 2025 accounts. The bottom-up Staff page figure of £2,972,529 sits within 0.3% of the FY2025 actual total staff cost of £2,962,804 (wages £2,644,610 plus social security, casual labour, staff meals, training, recruitment, uniform and staff property rent). The starting point for the +£1.57M is therefore an audited number, not a model output.

Line	What it covers	Amount
Current wage bill (fully loaded)	85 employees today across housekeeping, F&B, front office, kitchen, spa, and admin.	£2.97M / year
Positions reduced via agentic-AI absorption	Specific admin and turnover positions that agentic-AI software absorbs — detailed on the Staff page.	−£314k / year
New hires (fully loaded, base + on-costs + locum budget)	Clinical (Dr Shiv Chande, Dr Alexa Kerr, Dr Marie-Christine Dix, dietitian, Manas psychologist, kinesiologist, health coach, Deha radiographer), wellness & movement (Bala PTs), Ayush therapists, retail, marketing — with named candidates where secured.	+£1.81M / year
Forward wage bill (fully loaded)	Net incremental: +£1.57M / year	£4.47M / year

Why 57 fewer rooms does not mean 57 rooms' worth of savings

The obvious challenge to this plan is that the suite count falls 44% (129 → 72) while housekeeping falls by a single position and utilities go up. That looks wrong until the underlying driver is named: the square footage given over to guest rooms does not change. The consolidation re-divides the same area into 72 larger suites instead of 129 smaller rooms — it removes lettable units, not floor area. The same building is cleaned, heated, lit and maintained either way, now to a higher specification. Every cost line below follows from that single fact, and so does the revenue line: because the area is fixed, the correct measure of the commercial ask is revenue per square foot, which has to rise 49% — not the 167% RevPAR figure that the shrinking unit count produces as an artefact.

Housekeeping — flat, not down 44%. Of the 23 current positions, only 8 are directly room-facing (6 Housekeeping Attendants, 2 Room Attendants); night cleaning, public areas, laundry, linen and supervision are area- or function-driven and do not scale with room count. On the room-facing element, cleaning time tracks area and standard far more than door count: 129 standard rooms at ~30 minutes per turn is ~64 hours of labour per full changeover; 72 premium suites over the same square footage at ~55 minutes is ~66 hours. The workload is unchanged or marginally higher — which is why the Staff page carries a net −1 rather than the −8 a naive per-room ratio would suggest. Laundry and dry cleaning (£166,277 in FY2025) follows the same logic: fewer beds, heavier and more frequent linen.
Utilities — up, not down. Same envelope to heat and light, plus clinical HVAC running to a schedule rather than to occupancy. Worked through line by line in the electricity row of the P&L below: net +£33k/yr on a £146,788 FY2025 base.
Where the saving actually is. Not in the fabric, but in the ten specific administrative and turnover positions that agentic-AI software absorbs — −£313,950/year fully loaded, itemised role by role on the Staff page. That is a real, addressable saving. The room-count reduction is not; it is a revenue strategy, and it has to be underwritten on ADR, not on cost.

Detail on the phasing (which hires land when, tied to the physical build sequence) sits on the Staff page. At the modelled residential ramp, incremental wage bill is covered by programme contribution somewhere between end of Y2 and mid Y3; at the pessimistic scenario, cover extends into Y3-4. The interactive forecast below computes the working-capital gap live for any utilisation trajectory the reader wants to test.

Three · marketing, amortisation, and revenue growth · interactive

Marketing, amortisation, and revenue growth.

This is the core of the page. The five-year projection below is where the capex spend and the working-capital runway are pressure-tested against realistic residential ramp trajectories. Two revenue streams sit on top of the fixed cost base: residential programmes and the Discount Membership. Base hotel revenue (non-programme rooms, South Wing corporate long-stay studios, retail spa, Ahara covers, Lobby Cafe, Healthhaus spa-facility contribution) is captured directly in the P&L below. Elinor Ruth Medical Centre rental income is not in the P&L — that building sits with HdF Group Ltd outside the long lease. Adjust the utilisation sliders to stress-test the model against your own assumptions — Pessimistic, Modelled, Optimistic, and AI-downturn presets are one click each.

Your assumptions

Year 1 utilisation

22%

Year 2 utilisation

36%

Year 3 utilisation

47%

Year 4 utilisation

55%

Year 5 utilisation

60%

Include the Year 0 pre-launch campaign. Adds £300,000 of pre-opening marketing — charged to Year 1 here, since the model starts at launch — and lifts the utilisation sliders by +12pp Y1, +10pp Y2, +5pp Y3 and +2pp Y4 to reflect opening with a booking book and then carrying that brand awareness through the first few operating years rather than switching it off at launch. The uplift is the substitute for the brand carry a parent group would supply: Lanserhof Tegernsee opened at 35-40% on thirty years of Lanserhof Sylt behind it. Toggle on and the sliders move, so you can see exactly what is being assumed and override any year individually. Full case, including the deposit and risk-reduction arguments, on the Marketing page. Year 1 alone is still net negative on the P&L (the £300k lands before the uplift compounds), but cumulatively the campaign clears its own cost within the five-year horizon.

Include a 10-week soft launch for Jersey locals + friends and family. Deeply-discounted stays (60% off retail) for a mixed cohort of locals (marketed publicly to the island, not just personal contacts) and friends and family, in the ten weeks before opening to journalists and the public. Every stay carries structured feedback sessions — with Grace, Dr Chande and Dr Kerur where clinical. Purpose is operational stress-test, real testimonials, and a starter cohort of local repeat and referral bookings before external reviewers arrive. Net Y1 P&L hit: ~£350,000 incremental — this sits on top of the always-on £350k pre-launch operational readiness line (5-6 weeks of team onboarding before opening, which is real cost regardless of soft launch). The soft-launch increment covers 2-3 extra weeks of the guest-facing team running, consumables for ~100 guests, and Jersey-local marketing, less ~£120k of discounted revenue collected — at 60% off, per-guest revenue roughly covers per-guest direct delivery cost, so the number is dominated by the incremental fixed operational spend rather than the discount itself. Utilisation uplift from soft-launch alumni rebooking, referring, and providing content: +5pp Y1, +3pp Y2, +1pp Y3. Small next to the risk of opening to lukewarm journalist reviews.

Include the artist-in-residence programme. Adds a rotating calendar of visiting residencies drawn from the shortlist on the Artists page — musicians, movement teachers, chant leaders, sound artists. Scales 2 residencies in Year 1, then +2 per year to a steady state of 6 residencies per year from Year 3 onwards. Both sides of the ledger modelled: direct cost of ~£12.2k per residency (fees, travel, accommodation, board and production, with no offsetting revenue), plus a demand-side lift from advance advertising and shoulder-season timing that flows through in two ways — (a) the utilisation sliders above shift by +1pp Y1, +1pp Y2, +2pp Y3-Y5 to reflect ~5 additional programme guests per residency drawn by the artist's audience (these guests flow through the base programme unit economics — programme fee, direct cost, accommodation uplift, focus attach — rather than being counted as a single contribution number here), and (b) 12 additional non-programme room-nights per residency at ~£283 contribution (£323 ADR less ~£40 marginal servicing) shown in the residency section below. Toggle on and the sliders shift with pre-launch and soft-launch — off and they retreat. Editorial and PR value from the artist's platform is deliberately still not counted here.

Include the staff wellness programme in the forecast. Adds approximately £122,000 per year as a fixed cost line — the canteen upgrade across the full ~110-person team, plus annual Medilab bloods, DEXA scans, video-based EAP, and trigger-based nutritionist consultations for the 56 full-time permanent employees. Full eligibility logic on the Morale page. The programme is only introduced once the venture is safely profitable — the cost begins the year after whole-hotel profit before tax first clears £1M in a single year, so it is funded from real operating surplus rather than pushing an early year back into loss. Toggle on to see the impact.

Scenarios:

Year 1 result

(£1.23m)

launch year — pre-tax loss

Year 3 result

£0.80m

break-even year

5-year cumulative

£3.6m

pre-tax surplus

Break-even year

Year 3

first profitable operating year

Year	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5
Target utilisation	40%	50%	55%	59%	62%
Programme guests	541	676	744	798	838
Marketing & content spend (fixed — independent of utilisation)Materially increased, and no longer tapering. The earlier profile (£260k Y1 falling to £120k Y5) assumed organic demand would take over from acquisition spend within an existing customer base. That assumption does not survive the repositioning: the hotel is addressing a completely new market and deliberately exiting the channels that delivered 57% of FY2025 accommodation revenue, so there is no incumbent demand to taper onto. Acquisition spend therefore stays elevated and roughly flat, funding sustained international demand generation rather than a launch spike. This budget is not an addition to the distribution cost — it replaces it. The venture will not list on OTAs or sell through wholesale, so there is no commission line to pay; the money that would have gone to Booking.com at ~19% per booking is redirected into demand the hotel owns outright. The trade is deliberate and it improves with scale: commission is a variable cost that never falls as a percentage — 19% of every booking, on every repeat stay, forever — while marketing is a fixed cost that does. At £640k it is 10.1% of Year 1 revenue; at £610k it is 5.2% by Year 5, and it buys a guest list, a content library and a brand that stay on the balance sheet rather than a booking that has to be re-bought next year. It also buys a different kind of customer: an OTA delivers someone shopping for a room-night at ~£275, whereas direct acquisition delivers someone buying into the proposition who converts to a £1,790-£8,050 programme. This supersedes the totals on the Marketing page, which is scoped to the old £260k envelope and needs re-costing to match.
Paid media & acquisitionPR and editorial, paid social and search, press and influencer fam trips, launch events, partnership development, podcast and newsletter placement, international trade and referral partnerships. FY2025 actual marketing spend for comparison: £90,080	£520,000	£560,000	£520,000	£480,000	£460,000
Content production & teamRaised from £40k/yr. A new audience that has never heard of the property cannot be reached with a retained videographer alone — this funds an in-house content function: videographer, editor, and social/community manager, plus production budget for the YouTube long-form, Reels and TikTok, the podcast, the newsletter, and the clinical-authority surface that does the persuading before a guest ever enquires. Content is the primary acquisition asset for a longevity proposition, not a support line. Combined marketing + content: £640k Y1, holding at £610k Y5 — against a £300k / £160k profile previously, and £90,080 actual in FY2025	£120,000	£150,000	£150,000	£150,000	£150,000
Pre-launch operational readinessAlways on — this is real cost the venture will bear regardless of any toggle. ~5-6 weeks of the clinical team plus partial ramp of front-of-house, kitchen and Ayush therapy staff on payroll BEFORE opening — onboarding, protocol calibration, running mock consultations, practising four-Mati handoffs, dosha-tuned menu practice, Companion app support. Charged to Year 1 because the model starts at opening. Previously missing from the model, which implicitly assumed staff would start on Day 1 of Y1	(£350,000)	—	—	—	—
Year 0 pre-launch campaignoff unless the toggle above is selected. £300k of pre-opening acquisition — waitlist and founding-cohort building, editorial seeded ahead of opening, partnership pipeline, preview events, and the deposit and booking rails. Incurred before launch; charged to Year 1 here because the model starts at opening. Per-line breakdown on the Marketing page	—	—	—	—	—
Soft launch — 10 weeks, locals + F&Foff unless the toggle above is selected. ~£350k incremental Y1 cost on top of the always-on pre-launch onboarding line above — 2-3 extra weeks of the guest-facing team running, consumables for ~100 guests and Jersey-local marketing, less ~£120k of discounted revenue collected. At 60% off, per-guest revenue roughly covers per-guest direct delivery cost, so the number is dominated by the incremental fixed operational spend rather than the discount itself. Utilisation uplift (soft-launch alumni rebooking + referrals + refined product) is reflected in the sliders above when the toggle is on	—	—	—	—	—
Whole-hotel operating costsinformational — these lines represent the full-hotel cost base, now rebased on the FY2025 actuals set out in the baseline section at the top of this page rather than on estimates. The residential-programme contribution figure further down still uses the older aggregate cost model and does not yet subtract these lines cleanly. Full P&L reshape flagged as follow-up.
Total wage bill (fully loaded)the whole hotel forward wage bill per the Staff page. FY2025 actual: £2,962,804 (wages £2,644,610 + social security £178,082 + casual, meals, training, recruitment, uniform, staff property rent). Phased ramp to £4.47M as new hires sequence in across Y1-Y4 with the physical build (+£1.51M/yr over the 2025 actual at maturity). Note the F&B department alone ran wages at 60% of departmental income in 2025 — the Ahara relaunch has to bring that to a normal 30-35% or the incremental clinical hires are funding an existing loss	£3,400,000	£4,000,000	£4,300,000	£4,470,000	£4,470,000
Utilities — electricityFY2025 actual: £146,788. Rises despite 57 fewer bedrooms, because the square footage given over to guest rooms is unchanged — the 129→72 move re-divides the same area into larger suites rather than shrinking it. There is no floor-area saving to bank. Rooms (net +£4k): 57 fewer discrete units removes per-unit load — bathroom extracts, TVs, kettles, minibars (−£6k) — but the same area at a higher specification adds it back through denser lighting circuits, larger bathrooms and more AV (+£4k), and the Orion sleep beds running active climate control across all 72 suites plus the Aruna LED panels add £6k. Sama Clinic (net +£12k): per the Renovation spec, clinical-grade ventilation is fitted to one procedure room in the Kanti aesthetic suite — local exhaust and filtration so dermabrasion, laser plume and RF microneedling work can be done to standard, running to the appointment book rather than continuously (+£4k, not the whole-wing figure a clinical conversion would normally carry; the DEXA room needs lead shielding, not air handling, and the remaining rooms run on existing hotel HVAC); clinical equipment and medical-grade cold storage (+£6k); clinical lighting levels of 500-1,000 lux against 100-200 in a bedroom, run to a fixed daily schedule (+£3k); less the eight stripped-out en-suite bathrooms replaced by one shared WC (−£1k). Wellness estate (+£16k): Bala Gym plant and extended hours (+£7k), cryotherapy chamber ancillaries (+£5k, LN2 supply itself sits in the cryotherapy opex line), Ayush 8→10 treatment rooms (+£4k). Net +£32k/yr at maturity, +22%. The structural point for the board: bedroom load is variable and occupancy-linked; clinical load is fixed and schedule-linked. This conversion moves electricity from a cost that falls in a bad year to one that does not	£152,000	£166,000	£175,000	£179,000	£179,000
Utilities — gas, heating oil & waterFY2025 actual: £225,834 (gas £166,324, heating oil £33,733, water £25,778). Gas held broadly flat — renovation fabric improvements offset the widened kitchen operation across Ahara and the Lobby Cafe. Heating oil continues the switch already visible in the accounts (£74,692 → £33,733, −55% year on year) and tapers toward £20k. Water rises with the expanded spa, the additional treatment rooms and higher programme-guest laundry volumes	£228,000	£229,000	£230,000	£231,000	£230,000
Non-wage operating costs (excluding utilities)F&B cost of sales, laundry and dry cleaning, department and cleaning supplies, insurance, rates, professional fees, IT and software, renewal and repairs. FY2025 actual: £1,733,243 (cost of sales £628,927 + operating costs £364,240 + administrative £391,343 + repairs £219,650 + renewal £129,083). This corrects the previous £1.8M figure, which was derived by subtraction and silently included utilities — those are now a separate line above. Excludes existing hotel marketing (£90,080 in 2025), superseded by the marketing line at the top of this table, and excludes finance and depreciation, both shown separately. Grows with occupancy and the widened F&B footprint. Now includes: per-suite Philips AC2729/10 2-in-1 filter + humidifier-wick + descaling ~£8-11k/yr, per-suite aromatherapy trade-grade essential oil replenishment ~£6-10k/yr (housekeeping refills fixed dropper bottles from bulk stock), whole-property water-filter cartridge / RO-membrane refresh ~£3-5k/yr (from the extension of triple-filtered water to main / Imperial / South wings), and skin-friendly laundry chemistry uplift ~£2-3k/yr. Combined ~£19-29k/yr as a wellness-amenity + air-quality line under department supplies. Also now includes the clinical + regulatory compliance uplift specific to The Long Hotel: medical indemnity + clinical malpractice insurance (~£25-50k/yr for Sama Clinic scope of 8 clinicians + DEXA + aesthetic + phlebotomy), cyber liability + special-category data cover (~£5-15k/yr), fractional external DPO retainer + GDPR compliance tooling + annual audit (~£15-30k/yr), external clinical governance / compliance consultancy retainer + annual clinical audit (~£10-20k/yr), clinical waste management contract (~£3-8k/yr), medical equipment servicing + calibration (DEXA + aesthetic + cryo — ~£6-15k/yr), regulatory-monitoring retainer + JCC inspection prep (~£2-4k/yr). Aggregate marginal compliance envelope: ~£65-140k/yr above the Hotel de France baseline (£111-250k total including baseline compliance already carried today; ~0.9-2.1% of Y5 revenue). Full breakdown in Long-Hotel-Regulatory-Compliance-Annual-Costs.md working spec. Medical Director's registered-manager time sits in the wage line (no additional cost); one-off legal + JCC application launch spend (~£90-165k) is capitalised into pre-launch costs, not annual run-rate here.	£1,780,000	£1,900,000	£2,040,000	£2,160,000	£2,240,000
Finance costs — existing debt (paid by HdF Group, not this P&L)FY2025 actual: £664,805 — bank interest £505,220, financial charges £136,049, leasing charges £11,523, audit fees £10,175, stock write-offs £1,638. These loans predate the restructure and are secured against the building, which sits with HdF Group Ltd, so servicing them naturally belongs there rather than in the operating P&L. HdF's cash to cover this comes from £400k/yr ERM tenant rentals + ~£320k/yr net Healthhaus rent (£400k gross less £80k passed to The Long Hotel for electricity and cleaning of the Healthhaus space — see Healthhaus line above). Property income at HdF is taxed at 20% in Jersey on a net basis — after deducting the £665k debt interest and other property costs (insurance, structural maintenance), HdF sits at roughly break-even on property income (£720k in − £665k − ~£40k other ≈ £15k surplus). Tax charge is negligible and stays with HdF. Zero line here because the cost has migrated to the entity that owns the underlying asset	—	—	—	—	—
Finance costs — new-debt service (illustrative)The Long Hotel carries the new-debt service on the £11.82M-£18.11M capex raise — this is genuinely operating (the renovation is for the operating business), unlike the pre-existing loans above. Illustrative basis: 60% debt on the £14.25M capex midpoint (£8.55M) at ~6.5%, drawn in step with the build sequence — Y1 35% drawn, Y2 70%, Y3 onward fully drawn. This is a placeholder pending an agreed capital structure, not a term sheet. Sensitivity: every 10-percentage-point shift in the debt share moves the mature-year figure by ~£70k, and every 1% on the rate moves it by ~£65k. At 100% equity this line is nil, but the equity still requires a return	£75,000	£290,000	£420,000	£420,000	£400,000
Capital amortisation & replacementrenovation and equipment lines are the honest annual capital burden on the new capex figures — informational; the residential contribution below currently uses the older aggregate cost model and needs a full P&L reshape to reflect these lines properly (flagged follow-up)
Renovation amortisationlower bound of £9.04M-£14.35M ÷ ~27yr weighted avg life (incl. driveway paving estimate + kitchenette fit-out + Baubiologie-informed sleep spec + motorised blackout blinds + laundry uplift + FF&E) — reflects real premium-hotel practice: shell + fit-out are 30+ year assets, no full re-renovation for a generation. Ongoing furniture / paint / design refresh handled by the reserve line below rather than by amortising the full spend over a shorter cycle.	£250k	£250k	£250k	£250k	£250k
Ongoing refresh reserverolling annual reserve for furniture replacement (piecemeal, ~10yr cycle on items in high use), paint refresh (5-7yr cycle across the property), soft-furnishings and artwork refresh (5-8yr), plus design updates as trends change (10-15yr) — the honest ongoing capital-maintenance shape for a working premium hotel, distinct from amortising the original renovation	£150k	£150k	£150k	£150k	£150k
Sama Clinic equipment amortisationDEXA scanner, Kanti aesthetic suite (VISIA, HIFU, RF microneedling, LED), Kaya assessment room (single-plate + Theia3D motion capture, dynamometer, bioimpedance), AcuPebble, 12-lead ECG, phlebotomy fit-out — blended 6-8yr life	£35k	£35k	£35k	£35k	£35k
Bala Gym equipment amortisationstrength equipment (racks, dumbbells, cable machines), cardio (VO₂-capable), mobility kit — blended 7-10yr life	£20k	£20k	£20k	£20k	£20k
Wellness equipment amortisationcryotherapy chamber + LN2 infrastructure (10-15yr) + Ayush spa treatment tables and infrastructure (8yr) + Aruna LED panels when they land (Phase 03) — blended ~10yr life	£16k	£16k	£16k	£16k	£16k
Orion sleep beds amortisationOrion Sleep System units across all 72 suites — 5yr amortisation, refresh cycle Y6	£12k	£12k	£12k	£12k	£12k
Programme launch capex amortisation£187k programme infra + brand/content/software at 3-10yr lives	£36,679	£36,679	£36,679	£36,679	£36,679
Website refresh (Year 4)	—	—	—	£15,000	—
iPad replacement cycle (Year 5)	—	—	—	—	£10,500
Orion Sleep System refresh reserve	—	£4,000	£4,000	£4,000	£4,000
Optional · artist residencies2 residencies Y1 · 4 Y2 · 6 Y3-Y5 · advertised 12 months ahead and timed to shoulder season, so residency-driven room-nights are additive rather than reallocated
Artist residency costs~£12,200 per residency, taken straight from the Artists page budget: fees £53k across six (one flagship £22k, three mid-tier £24k, two emerging £7k) + travel and accommodation £12k + production £8k = £73k, or £12,167 each, rounded up to £12,200. No offsetting revenue. Ticketed sessions in Kala were considered and rejected — the room stays closed to the public so programme guests are not sharing it — and the optional performance at The Bridge pays the artist, less that venue's hire, rather than the hotel. Content capture and promotion are excluded by design — the recording rig is built into the Kala room and sits in its capex, and production is handled by the part-time content hire, so charging either here would count them twice	—	—	—	—	—
Residency-driven bookingsper residency: +5 additional programme guests (drawn by the artist's audience) + 12 additional room-nights at ~£235 contribution after marginal servicing — advance advertising and shoulder-season timing means these are net-new, not displaced	—	—	—	—	—
Artist residencies — net contribution	—	—	—	—	—
Optional · staff wellness programme
Staff wellness programme	—	—	—	—	—
Programme bookings by tierat assumed mix — Weekend 40% / Pause 30% / Reset 20% / View 10%
Long Weekend guests£800 fee each	—	—	—	—	—
Long Pause guests£1,790 fee each	—	—	—	—	—
Long Reset guests£3,290 fee each	—	—	—	—	—
Long View guests£8,050 fee each	—	—	—	—	—
Focus revenue by typeeach Focus priced and attached separately; attached count driven by programme mix × attach share; Focus-only stays (guest buys a Focus without the programme spine) modelled as a separate ramp
Kanti (aesthetic)£1,800 · 15% attach share of Focus slots	—	—	—	—	—
Klesha (stress & burnout)£1,200 · 18% attach share	—	—	—	—	—
Manas (depth psychology)£1,200 · 10% attach share	—	—	—	—	—
Agni (gut · GI-MAP standard)£1,200 · 12% attach share	—	—	—	—	—
Nidra (sleep)£800 · 22% attach share	—	—	—	—	—
Kaya (movement)£900 · 9% attach share	—	—	—	—	—
Bala (performance)£1,500 · 8% attach share	—	—	—	—	—
Upavasa (FMD)£900 · 6% attach share	—	—	—	—	—
Focus-only staysindependent bookings without the programme spine — 20 Y1 → 150 Y5 at £1,200 blended	—	—	—	—	—
Revenue — recomputed from utilisation
Programme fee revenue (Weekend + Pause + Reset + View)	£549,000	£1,154,000	£2,000,000	£2,682,000	£3,105,000
Total Focus revenue (attached + Focus-only stays)	—	—	—	—	—
Accommodation uplift from programme guestsincludes the rooms of non-participating companions travelling with a programme guest — they are part of this line, not a separate one	£257,000	£461,000	£635,000	£761,000	£824,000
Hotel base revenue (non-programme) — decomposed by channelRebuilt on the FY2025 channel mix, because the repositioning does not carry the existing market with it. The accounts break accommodation into five channels, and they behave very differently under the new proposition: Extranet £1,192,006 and Tour Operator £242,743 — 57% of FY2025 accommodation revenue — are wholesale and OTA volume that cannot coexist with £300-500/night longevity suites without destroying rate integrity. Those channels are deliberately exited, not lost. Corporate (£342,584) and F.I.T (£727,345) partially retain and reprice. Everything above that has to be built new. Modelling this as one blended "non-programme room revenue" line, as the previous version did, concealed the transition entirely
Accommodation — legacy channels being exitedExtranet (OTA) + Tour Operator. FY2025 actual: £1,434,749. Wound down to nil across Y1-Y3. This is a decision, not a drift, and the reason is margin structure rather than brand preference. FY2025 agency commission was £227,047 — roughly 19% of the extranet line — and that commission lands on the one part of the business that actually earns. Room-nights carry a marginal servicing cost of only ~£35-50 (housekeeping labour, linen, consumables, utilities), so a £275 suite is ~85% gross margin; a 19% commission takes ~£52 of it, which is more than the entire cost of servicing the room. Programme delivery, by contrast, is expensive — clinical staff, treatments, Medilab pass-through, Elinor Ruth referrals run at £1,253/guest in Y1 — so it is the room margin that sustains the programme, not the other way round. Put a programme guest through an OTA at 19% of their £2,619 blended package and the commission is ~£498, roughly a third of the £1,717 contribution that guest generates. The channel is not merely dilutive at this price point; it removes the margin the clinical operation is funded from. Hence: no OTA distribution, no wholesale, and the acquisition budget above spent on building direct demand instead	£570,000	£200,000	£50,000	£0	£0
Accommodation — retained corporate & F.I.TCorporate (Jersey finance sector, which continues to need rooms) + Free Independent Travellers, the channel closest in character to the new market. FY2025 actual: £1,069,929. Dips through the renovation and repositioning, then holds and reprices upward — fewer room-nights at materially higher rate	£880,000	£820,000	£790,000	£790,000	£800,000
Accommodation — new market, non-programmeBuilt from zero. Guests drawn by the repositioning who are not on a residential programme — the longevity-adjacent leisure traveller, returning programme alumni on non-clinical stays, and companions. This is the line the increased marketing and content spend is buying, and it carries no FY2025 antecedent. Blended ADR £323/night — the floor of every band across the six-tier suite pricing on the Renovation page (T6 £200 through T1 £480, weighted by the 5/15/15/23/9/5 room split across the 72 suites). This is the model's committed rate assumption; the previous £275 figure sat below every tier's floor and has been raised to reflect actual tier pricing. Midpoint pricing of ~£354/night remains additional unmodelled upside — the tabulated uplift sits below this table. Room-count split, stated plainly. The 72-suite conversion is further divided: 57 Orion-equipped programme / leisure suites (this line) plus 15 South Wing corporate long-stay studios (line below). This line therefore prices ~20,800 available room-nights (57 × 365), not 26,280. The right denominator remains floor area, not unit count: the square footage given over to guest rooms does not change — 129 rooms are re-divided into 72 larger units across the same space, of which 15 carry a kitchenette and target corporate long-stay. On that basis, summing all four accommodation lines (legacy, retained, new-market and programme) and the corporate studios, the ask is that the same room floor area produces ~£4.1M by Y3 and ~£5.3M by Y5, against the £2,510,697 it produced in FY2025 — uplifts of ~63% and ~111% (revised down from ~76% / ~124% following the Sep 2026 South Wing corporate ADR revision), achieved through rate and mix rather than through selling more space. Expressed as RevPAR on the 57-suite pool: Y3 needs ~£80 and Y5 needs ~£118 on this line alone. The occupancy cross-check: £118 RevPAR at £323 ADR is ~37% occupancy at Y5 on the 57-suite pool. Adding programme accommodation and retained legacy occupancy back into the same room-nights, the total suite pool runs comfortably within a mature premium property's operating range. Note the Y1-Y2 trough: non-programme accommodation falls to ~£1.87M in Y1 — below FY2025 — because the exited channels go before the new market arrives. That trough is the single largest driver of the working-capital requirement set out at the foot of this page. The corporate studios (line below) partly offset the trough — but only partly, because the revised £170 blended ADR and 40% Y1 occupancy assumption (both dropped following Ryan's Sep 2026 pushback on post-COVID Big 4 secondment volumes) means the corporate line contributes ~£372k Y1 rather than the ~£722k it did on the earlier assumption. The volume constraint on the 57-suite pool is real — 20,805 available room-nights is a hard ceiling on programme + leisure — but the accounts show why that is the right bet: accommodation fell £462,730 year on year and missed budget by £1.04M, so the alternative to repositioning is not the status quo, it is continued decline	£186,000	£881,000	£1,671,000	£2,180,000	£2,461,000
South Wing corporate long-stay studios (15 rooms)New line — 15 South Wing rooms repurposed as corporate long-stay studios with kitchenettes. Weekly clean, no daily housekeeping, no concierge (Jersey is small enough that guests self-orient), no included breakfast, no full-board option, no priority Ayush booking (that priority stays with suite guests). Basic pantry stocked (olive oil, vinegar, salt, pepper, tea, coffee, herbs) and a dedicated laundry room exists in the wing (token-operated, priced as an extra). Spa and gym access are NOT included in the base rate — they are add-ons at £40/day, £175/week, or £400/month per guest. Unbundling keeps the base rate competitive against Jersey serviced-apartment operators (Liberty Wharf, etc.) who do not offer spa/gym, rather than pricing us out of the corporate long-stay market by including amenities not every guest wants. Add-on take-up modelled at ~35-45% of corporate guest-nights. Locker room service: the current bag-storage room to the left of the lobby entrance is converted into a locker room with two locker sizes — standard (£20/month, fits toiletries + gym kit) and suit-height (£60/month, fits 2-3 hanging suits + shelf + drawer). Deliberately priced low — the locker service is a retention driver, not a revenue line. A guest whose suits and toiletries are at The Long Hotel is materially more likely to book back for their next Jersey rotation than a guest who packs from scratch each time. Also open to Bala Gym monthly members as a gym-kit add-on. Target market: Big 4 auditors (year-end and interim engagement stays of 1-4 weeks), regulatory / legal counsel visiting Jersey for TCF and prudential inspections, and wealth-management consultants doing multi-week client rotations. Rate reality check (revised Sep 2026 following Ryan LeCouteur's pushback). Jersey's finance-sector visitor population still exists but Big 4 secondments to Jersey have materially reduced post-COVID — most engagement work is done remotely with only final sign-off requiring physical presence. Big 4 travel policies do allow £200-£250/night for senior managers on short stays, but that is not what these rooms are being marketed for. Long-stay comparable: Liberty Wharf Apartments offers 28-night January stays at ~£125/night. HdF's own FY2025 corporate blended ADR (which includes short-stay senior-manager travel) was £108.79. Pricing (revised): two tiers — front-facing rooms (6 of 15, town + distant ocean views) at £190/night; rear-facing (9 of 15, courtyard views) at £155/night. Blended £170/night (was £220). Occupancy ramp (revised): Y1 40%, Y2 55%, Y3 65%, Y4 70%, Y5 75% — building corporate account relationships takes 12-18 months from a standing start, and the sustainable ceiling now reflects the reduced Big 4 demand pool. The math ties. 5,475 available room-nights × ADR × occupancy = £372k Y1 → £698k Y5 (previously £722k → £1,024k at the un-tied £220 assumption). Optionality: if programme demand ever pressures the 57-suite pool, studios remain bookable ad-hoc for programme guests; full conversion back to Orion-equipped suites (kitchenette removal, wardrobe re-fit, plumbing capping) costs ~£145k and takes 2-3 months.	£372,000	£512,000	£605,000	£652,000	£698,000
Healthhaus contribution (Long Hotel portion)Total Healthhaus payment ~£60k/month. Now formally split into three components. Rent for the exclusive-use Healthhaus footprint — fitness area, treatment rooms, back-of-house — nominally £400k/yr to HdF Group as landlord, less the ~£80k/yr of electricity and cleaning of that space that The Long Hotel actually pays, so HdF's net rent is ~£320k/yr and the £80k flows back to Long Hotel as reimbursement for services provided. Service payment for shared spa/pool amenity access for Healthhaus members — the remainder of the total payment, and the portion that steps down from Y2 as spa-access caps for Healthhaus members are introduced (capped monthly days OR restricted pool-access windows), plus proposal to reserve pool loungers for hotel guests. What sits in this P&L: the £80k elec/cleaning reimbursement + the spa-service payment. Y1: £320k spa + £80k reimbursement = £400k. Y2+: £200k spa + £80k reimbursement = £280k. HdF Group's £320k net rent is outside this P&L (used to service pre-existing debt — see finance-costs note below). Why the split matters: the previous "all as spa-facility use" framing was a stretch that a diligence team could flag — Healthhaus occupies dedicated space, and an arm's-length landlord would charge rent for it. Splitting into "rent for exclusive footprint + service payment for shared amenity + reimbursement of pass-through utilities" mirrors what a real commercial arrangement would look like, so it is more robust to Comptroller scrutiny, not less. Trade-off: modest reduction in the spa contribution vs materially better hotel-guest experience of the pool + spa capacity	£400,000	£280,000	£280,000	£280,000	£280,000
Ayush Spa bookings — local + hotel guests + à la carte programmeFY2025 actual: £886,804 (from Ryan's aggregate-code breakdown — spa treatments under the Sundry sales code) across 8 treatment rooms serving Jersey residents, non-programme hotel guests, Discount Membership members and gift-voucher recipients at retail brochure pricing (~£150 avg per treatment). Ayush Spa is 20 years established, widely regarded as the best on the island — held immune to the utilisation sliders because that local base is independent of programme guest volumes and would continue at trend even in a downturn scenario. The ramp above the FY2025 base reflects two structural changes on top of the existing run-rate: (1) the renovation takes the spa from 8 to 10 treatment rooms, +25% capacity, landing mid-Y2 — expected to add ~£220k/yr at maturity (per-room revenue currently ~£110k); and (2) Ayush spa treatments have been unbundled from the residential programme fee — programme guests can request a written Ayurvedic prescription from their Prakriti Mati consultation on an opt-in basis and book their treatments à la carte at retail brochure prices — with or without the prescription guiding them, which is net-new revenue for the Ayush department (previously delivered at internal cost inside the bundled programme fee). Modelled at ~3-4 treatments per programme guest with 60-70% take-up at ~£150 avg. Even at Y5 (£1.61M) the spa runs at ~55% of its theoretical maximum capacity across 10 rooms, so growth beyond this ramp is available if demand supports it	£887,000	£1,112,000	£1,337,000	£1,487,000	£1,607,000
Ahara restaurant — non-programme covershotel guests + Jersey walk-ins for the longevity kitchen. Reconciliation flag: FY2025 F&B income was already £1,228,432 (bar £268,178, food £960,255), so the Y1 figure here plus the Lobby Cafe (£560k combined) sits well below the existing run-rate. Either these lines are counting only the incremental covers above the current base, or the existing La Terrasse revenue is missing from the model — this needs resolving before the P&L reshape. The more important number is on the cost side: that £1.23M of income produced a £10,830 departmental loss with wages at 60% of income, so Ahara's case rests on margin, not volume	£1,050,000	£1,200,000	£1,400,000	£1,600,000	£1,750,000
Lobby Cafenew — coffee, pastries, light lunch counter in the main lobby	£80,000	£130,000	£180,000	£220,000	£250,000
Other income (staff accommodation rent, misc. receipts, room hire, retail)The remainder of FY2025 sundry and non-operating income once Healthhaus, Ayush retail and the (excluded) Elinor Ruth Medical Centre rentals are taken out — principally staff accommodation rent (£258,540 actual, Westview Apartments) and misc. receipts (£444,997 actual). Reconciliation note: the FY2025 sundry + non-operating total is £2,361,397, of which ~£400k represents ERM tenant income that now sits with HdF Group (not The Long Hotel) — so the total in this P&L is ~£1,960k (Healthhaus £720k + Ayush retail £500k + this line at £740k) rather than the £2,360k that appeared in earlier versions of the model. Sundry sits behind two aggregate ledger codes; the split is derived, not sourced, and confirming it is the single highest-value piece of diligence prep outstanding. Staff rent is modelled to rise modestly as clinical hires take accommodation	£740,000	£750,000	£760,000	£770,000	£780,000
Expired voucher write-offFY2025 actual: £35,201; £46,738 expired in 2025 (indicative of what will be written off in 2026). Voucher sales are consistent at ~£415k/yr with a 12-month redemption period; historically 7.5-12.5% of sales are written off after the balance is retained ~12 months post-expiry. Modelled at ~£40-50k/yr recurring, held immune to the scenario factor because it does not flex with programme utilisation	£40,000	£42,000	£45,000	£48,000	£50,000
Total programme revenueprogramme fees + programme accommodation only — not the whole-hotel total. The base-hotel lines above and the full roll-up to profit before tax sit in the whole-hotel P&L at the foot of this table	£806,000	£1,614,000	£2,635,000	£3,442,000	£3,929,000
Economic result · residential programme
Residential programme contribution (after costs & amortisation)	(£27,000)	£552,000	£1,190,000	£1,599,000	£1,844,000
Discount Membership
Discount Membership revenue150 members Y1 → 600 Y5, £200/year each	£30,000	£50,000	£80,000	£100,000	£120,000
Net discount costgross discount less incremental margin recovery from driven bookings	(£7,000)	(£11,000)	(£17,000)	(£22,000)	(£26,000)
Discount Membership net contribution	£23,000	£39,000	£63,000	£78,000	£94,000
B2B corporate programmes — The Long Boardroomfive-day executive longevity retreat sold to a single-organisation cohort of 6-8 executives per booking at £3,500-£5,000/head (~£30k blended per booking). Full corporate SKU on the Programmes page; B2B sales scope on the Marketing page. Y1 is investment-only (sales cycle 6-9 months from first meeting); revenue builds Y2 onwards. Booking cost includes both the partial-year corporate-sales headcount and the compressed Long Reset clinical delivery cost per cohort. Counter-cyclical to leisure demand and mid-week complementary to weekend leisure clustering — treated as net-additive to the base P&L rather than displacing individual-programme revenue
Corporate programme revenueY2 7 bookings → Y5 23 bookings, ~£30k blended per corporate booking	£0	£210,000	£450,000	£600,000	£700,000
Corporate direct costcorporate-sales headcount (£30k Y1 pro-rata → £75k Y2+ loaded) + Long Reset clinical delivery per pax (~£750/pax × 6-8 pax per booking)	(£30,000)	(£107,000)	(£154,000)	(£180,000)	(£200,000)
Corporate B2B net contribution	(£30,000)	£103,000	£296,000	£420,000	£500,000
Cryotherapy (Phase 02 standard)
Cryotherapy local-membership revenue	—	—	—	—	—
Cryotherapy annual operating cost	—	—	—	—	—
Cryotherapy contribution (net)	—	—	—	—	—
Combined economic result
Combined annual contribution	£168,000	£802,000	£1,485,000	£1,914,000	£2,159,000
Cumulative combined contribution	£168,000	£970,000	£2,455,000	£4,369,000	£6,528,000
Whole-hotel P&L — the reshapeEverything above this point is the programme layer: it shows what the residential programme, membership and cryotherapy contribute in isolation. That view was the whole of the previous model, and it flattered the case, because it netted programme contribution against an aggregate fixed-cost bucket rather than against the hotel's real cost base. These lines complete the reshape. They take every revenue line on this page, subtract every cost line on this page, and land on profit before tax on the same basis as the FY2025 accounts at the top — so the forecast and the actuals can be read against each other directly. FY2025 comparators: total income including non-operating £6,100,526, profit before tax £82,692
Total revenue — whole hotelprogramme fees + programme accommodation + Focus + all four accommodation channels + Ahara + Lobby Cafe + Ayush retail + Healthhaus spa-facility contribution + other income + membership + cryotherapy. Excludes Elinor Ruth Medical Centre rentals — those sit with HdF Group and are outside The Long Hotel P&L	—	—	—	—	—
Programme & Focus direct costsclinical and therapist time, treatments, Medilab pass-through, Elinor Ruth referral fees, programme food cost. Derived per guest from the model's own unit economics as (programme revenue + accommodation − contribution per guest): £1,253/guest Y1 falling to £902 by Y5 as fixed clinical time is spread across more guests. Focus streams carry a 40% direct-cost ratio	—	—	—	—	—
Cost of sales — F&B, commission, otherFY2025 actual: £628,927. F&B cost of sales at ~30% of Ahara and Lobby Cafe revenue (FY2025: food £299,977 + beverage £65,222 on £1,228,432 of F&B income = 29.7%), plus agency commission falling from £227,047 as the extranet channel is exited, plus allowances, discounts and misc. cost of sales	—	—	—	—	—
Operating costs — wages, utilities, otherthe whole-hotel operating cost block set out earlier in this table: wage bill £3.4M → £4.47M, electricity £152k → £179k, gas/oil/water £228k → £230k, and other operating costs excluding utilities and cost of sales (FY2025 actual £1,104,316 — laundry, supplies, insurance, rates, professional fees, IT, renewal, repairs) growing to £1.55M (includes the ~£65-140k Long Hotel-specific clinical + regulatory compliance uplift at mature Y3-Y5 state — see non-wage operating costs row above for the itemised breakdown)	—	—	—	—	—
Marketing & contentper the increased lines at the top of this table — £640k Y1, £610k Y5, against £90,080 actual in FY2025	—	—	—	—	—
EBITDAbefore amortisation and finance costs — the measure a lender underwrites against. FY2025 equivalent: ~£941k (operating profit £1,068,395 + non-operating income £703,538 − administrative, renewal, repairs and marketing of £830,156)	—	—	—	—	—
Amortisation & refresh reservethe capital block set out earlier: renovation £250k, refresh reserve £150k, Sama equipment £35k, Bala £20k, wellness £16k, Orion beds £12k, programme launch capex £36,679, plus website and iPad refresh cycles. FY2025 actual depreciation for comparison: £194,280	—	—	—	—	—
Finance costs — new-debt onlyillustrative new-debt service on the £11.82M-£18.11M capex raise, reaching ~£420k at full drawdown. The £665k of pre-existing debt has been reallocated to HdF Group, which owns the building the loans are secured against and services them from ERM rentals + £400k Healthhaus rent	—	—	—	—	—
Financial charges — recurring (banking + transaction fees)£85,345/yr recurring per Ryan. The transactional portion of the FY2025 £136,049 financial-charges line (bank charges, card-processing fees, merchant-service fees) that recurs annually — the remainder was one-off. Held flat because these fees are transactional, not principal-based, and largely unaffected by the capex raise. Distinct from the new-debt service above (interest on the £11.82M-£18.11M raise) and from the pre-existing bank interest (paid by HdF Group, not this P&L)	—	—	—	—	—
Profit before tax — whole hoteldirectly comparable with the £82,692 FY2025 actual at the top of this page	—	—	—	—	—
Cumulative profit before taxthe low point of this row is the working-capital requirement the raise has to cover in addition to capex	—	—	—	—	—

Long-horizon cumulative PBT — Y5 mature PBT held flat, no growth

Cumulative profit before tax after 10 years	—
Cumulative profit before tax after 15 years	—
Cumulative profit before tax after 20 years	—

Extends the 5-year model forward by holding Year 5 mature PBT flat — no inflation-matched growth, no continued Discount Membership compounding, no repeat-guest / referral share lift, no Phase 03 Long Club London upside. Deliberately conservative floors: real 20-year performance would very likely land materially above these numbers even before any strategic optionality is added. Recalculates live from the scenario slider above (Pessimistic / Modelled / Optimistic / AI downturn all reflected). Jersey hospitality trading tax is 0%, so PBT ≈ PAT.

Marketing tapers across the five years as organic demand (editorial, word-of-mouth, returning guests) takes over from acquisition spend. Amortisation is calculated on a double straight-line basis across five years to reflect both accounting prudence and the reality that some equipment (iPads, web technology) has a shorter useful life than the hotel structure. Replacement reserves are built in from Year 2 to avoid cliff-edge capital requirements later.

Revenue and contribution recalculate from the utilisation sliders using the programme unit economics. All programme guests are longevity (Long Weekend, Long Pause, Long Reset, Long View). Fixed costs (marketing, staff, capital charge) are independent of utilisation and do not move. See how the figures are derived →

Note — Elinor Ruth Medical Centre suite rentals are not in this P&L. The Elinor Ruth Medical Centre building is owned by Hotel de France Group Ltd but is not included in the long lease to The Long Group Ltd (only the hotel property and Rosebank staff accommodation are). Tenant income from the practitioners renting suites there is paid directly to HdF Group and stays outside this P&L. The Medical Centre remains structurally relevant to The Long Hotel's operations as the referral route for MRI, CT and X-ray imaging — those referral fees appear as costs within programme direct costs, not as revenue to The Long Hotel.

"Programme guests" counts individuals on the programme, not bookings. A couple where both partners participate counts as two programme guests and pays two programme fees; a couple where only one partner participates counts as one. The spend of a non-participating companion is captured, in two different places. Their room sits inside the programme accommodation line — the per-guest accommodation figure (£867 Y1 falling to £731 Y5) is explicitly defined as programme-guest rooms plus non-participating partner rooms, so it is already in the P&L rather than held outside it. Their food and other spend lands in the base-hotel revenue lines above, in Ahara non-programme covers and the Lobby Cafe.

What the reshaped P&L says, at the modelled ramp

The default view above has the four optional levers turned on — Year 0 pre-launch campaign, ten-week soft launch, artist-in-residence programme, and staff wellness — because they represent the plan we would actually run, not a stripped-down baseline. Toggle any of them off individually to see what it costs to remove. The model also reflects the corporate structure fully: the pre-existing £665k/yr of debt is serviced by HdF Group (which owns the building the loans are secured against), and the Healthhaus payment now splits into a £320k/yr net rent to HdF plus ~£280k/yr to The Long Hotel (spa-facility use + reimbursement for the electricity and cleaning of the Healthhaus space that Long Hotel actually pays). Measured against the real FY2025 cost base, with the legacy channels exited and marketing at the level the new market actually requires, the shape is a V that clears cumulatively positive in Year 5 (revised from Year 4 following the Sep 2026 South Wing corporate ADR adjustment, which took ~£326k/yr off the mature run-rate):

Year 1 is the only materially loss-making year at ~£1.23M pre-tax. The £300k pre-launch spend charges into Y1 (since the model starts at launch), and the ~£350k soft-launch increment lands the same year. Both bought volume: Year 1 utilisation runs at 40% rather than the unshifted 22%, so revenue is ~£7.30M rather than the ~£6.4M an untouched baseline would produce. The exited channels still go before the new market arrives, and the wage bill still lands in full — but demand-side offsets and the removal of pre-existing debt from this P&L absorb most of what would otherwise have been a second heavy loss year.
Year 2 is a residual loss at ~£450k pre-tax (deepened by the Sep 2026 corporate-ADR revision and the Sep 2026 explicit clinical + regulatory compliance uplift — was ~£100k pre both). EBITDA remains positive at ~£360k; the gap between EBITDA and PBT is amortisation plus new-debt service stepping up as the full drawdown lands. Cumulative PBT bottoms at ~−£2.02M at end-Year 2.
Break-even lands in Year 3 at ~£450k pre-tax (was £800k before both revisions), Year 4 sits below cumulative break-even (~−£230k), and Year 5 crosses cumulatively positive. Year 5 reaches ~£1.97M PBT on ~£11.8M of revenue — a 16.7% pre-tax margin against 1.5% in FY2025, with Year 5 EBITDA of ~£2.91M (24.7%). The venture repays its own transition inside the five-year window and closes Y5 with ~£1.77M of accumulated pre-tax surplus. Modelled Y5 utilisation now sits at peer median (62%) — SHA Wellness ~60%, Lanserhof Tegernsee 60-65%, Palazzo Fiuggi 50-55%, Chiva-Som 65-70% — rather than at the top of the peer band.
The funding requirement is materially larger post-revision, but still tractable. Cumulative PBT bottoms at ~−£2.0M at end-Year 2. Adding back non-cash amortisation of ~£1.04M over those two years, the cash working-capital requirement is ~£960k — up from ~£290k pre-revision — and it sits on top of the £11.82M-£18.11M of capex, not inside it. The five-year cumulative position is ~£2.0M positive on a pre-tax basis (was ~£3.6M pre-revision). Toggle off the pre-launch, soft-launch and residencies levers to see what the case looks like without them: the trough deepens materially, the cash requirement multiplies further, and break-even slides a further year.

Year 0 — the pre-launch campaign, and what it is worth

The trough above is driven by a specific problem: the venture opens its doors with no booking book. Every comparable launch that performed well in Year 1 did so on inherited awareness — Lanserhof Tegernsee opened at 35-40% because thirty years of Lanserhof Sylt preceded it. The Long Hotel has no such carry, which is why the base case sits at 22%. A pre-launch campaign running roughly twelve months ahead of opening is the direct substitute for brand carry: it manufactures the awareness a parent brand would otherwise have supplied, and it opens the booking book before the doors. This is modelled as Year 0 — it sits outside the five-year P&L above and is additive to the funding requirement.

Year 1 utilisation achieved	Guests	Year 1 PBT	vs base
22% — base case, no pre-launch	297	(£1,517,924)	—
26%	351	(£1,401,860)	+£116,064
30%	405	(£1,285,795)	+£232,129
32.4% — the level at which a £300k Year 0 campaign repays itself in Year 1 alone	437	(£1,217,924)	+£300,000
38% — Lanserhof-comparable opening	513	(£1,053,667)	+£464,258

The hurdle, stated honestly. Each incremental Year 1 programme guest carries £2,149 of pre-tax contribution, so a £300k Year 0 campaign needs 140 additional guests — a move from 22% to 32.4% — to repay itself within Year 1. That is a 47% lift on base-case volume and should not be assumed lightly. The case improves materially once Year 2 is counted: awareness built in Year 0 compounds, and each Year 2 guest is worth £2,235. A campaign lifting Year 1 to 30% and Year 2 from 38% to 44% returns roughly £413,000 against £300,000 spent — and shortens the loss-making period rather than merely reducing its depth.
The cash effect is separate from the P&L effect, and larger. Advance bookings bring deposits, and deposits arrive before opening. At 405 Year 1 guests on a ~£2,619 blended package, with half booking pre-opening at a 30% deposit, that is roughly £150,000-£200,000 of cash received during Year 0 — landing precisely when the funding requirement peaks. Advance selling is not just revenue timing; it is a working-capital instrument.
The real argument is information, not demand. The single largest unhedged risk in this document is that Year 1 utilisation of 22% is an assumption that cannot be tested until the doors open — by which point the full £11.82M-£18.11M is committed. A pre-launch campaign converts it into an observable: waitlist size, deposit conversion rate and enquiry quality are all measurable twelve months out. If the waitlist does not convert, that is discovered while the final tranche of capex is still uncommitted and the build can be slowed or rescoped. Bought purely as risk reduction, £300k against a £17M commitment is cheap.
What the £300k actually buys. Waitlist and founding-cohort acquisition (the Discount Membership's 150-member Year 1 cohort can be sold entirely in Year 0, giving both fee revenue and a warm list); editorial seeded ahead of opening, where lead times run three to six months for the tier-1 titles that matter; partnership pipelines with genuinely long gestation (Aiglon, wealth managers, fitness studios, Orion); and the content library live and accumulating search authority before it is needed. Note that the asset build — brand identity, website, photography, evergreen video, app MVP — is already funded inside the £187k launch content & software capex line. Year 0 marketing is the distribution of those assets, not their creation.
What this requires next. The Marketing page currently has no Year 0 column at all — it begins at launch. Adding one, with the channel-level split and the lead times that justify a twelve-month runway, is the work this decision depends on. Until then the £300k here is an order-of-magnitude placeholder, deliberately round.

The base case above does not assume any of this. Year 1 is held at 22% so that the forecast remains honest about what happens with no pre-launch investment, and so the pre-launch case can be judged on its own merits rather than smuggled into the headline. Use the Year 1 slider to test any of the trajectories in the table.

Why the clinic is priced for demand, not for margin

The margin structure across the two halves of the business is deliberately uneven, and it is worth stating plainly rather than letting a reader discover it and assume it is an error. A room-night is roughly 88% gross margin — at £323 ADR the marginal cost of servicing it is only ~£40 in housekeeping labour, linen, consumables and utilities. The programme fee is roughly 52% — £1,888 per guest at Y5 against £902 of clinical delivery cost, because doctors, treatments, Medilab work and Elinor Ruth referrals are genuinely expensive to provide. Focus streams sit between the two at ~60%.

That gap is the design, not a flaw in it. The clinic is the reason to come; the rooms are where the money is made. A guest does not fly to Jersey for a hotel room — they come for a clinical programme, and then occupy a high-margin suite for three to fourteen nights while they do it. Assessing Sama Clinic on its own margin therefore measures the wrong thing: its commercial job is to generate room-nights that would not otherwise exist, in months when they otherwise would not exist.

It is a demand driver, not a true loss leader. The constraint is firm: treatments must be priced above the cost of delivering them, and on the modelled economics they are — the clinical element contributes ~£986 per guest on the programme fee plus ~£807 on attached Focus streams. What the clinic is not asked to do is carry hotel-level margin. It is asked to wash its face on delivery cost, cover its own clinical payroll and equipment, and fill rooms. Now verified below: the Sama Clinic departmental P&L in the next section builds this from the specific positions and salaries on the Staff page, in the format the FY2025 accounts already use for F&B. It confirms the clinic covers its delivery costs throughout — but shows it runs a £125,236 departmental loss in Year 1 on volume rather than pricing, turning positive in Year 2.
The prize is seasonality, and the FY2025 accounts size it exactly. Compare December against an average month: accommodation revenue ran at 18% of the monthly average (£38,478 against £209,225), while staff costs held at 81% (£199,841 against £246,900) and utilities rose to 126% (£39,167 against £31,052 — winter heating). The result was an operating loss of £82,998 in a year that made £1,068,395. The Christmas closure explains part of that, but the closure exists because the demand does not — and the payroll and the boiler do not close with it. Revenue is seasonal; the cost base is not. That mismatch is the structural weakness in the current business.
Clinical demand is not weather-dependent. A guest booking a Long Reset is buying a measured physiological outcome on a schedule the hotel controls, not a summer in Jersey. January and February are, if anything, when people most want a reset. Every programme guest placed into a shoulder or winter month carries roughly £2,414 of contribution (~£986 programme + ~£621 accommodation + ~£807 Focus) into a period whose fixed cost base is already being paid for regardless. That is the mechanism by which a lower-margin clinic makes the higher-margin hotel more profitable.
The risk, stated fairly. This structure concentrates exposure in the clinical payroll, which is largely fixed — salaried doctors do not flex with utilisation. If programme volumes disappoint, the hotel carries that cost base and loses the room-nights it was meant to unlock, so the two failures compound rather than offset. This is the strongest argument for the conservative utilisation ramp and for testing the Pessimistic and AI-downturn presets above before committing.

What this model captures, and what it doesn't. The whole-hotel P&L now consolidates every revenue and cost line on this page onto the same basis as the FY2025 accounts. On tax: Jersey hospitality companies fall under the general 0% corporate income tax rate, so the profit-before-tax figures above are effectively post-tax for the operating entity — no forward tax charge to model. Three things remain deliberately outside the P&L. First, the capital structure — the new-debt service is illustrative until the debt/equity split is agreed, and it swings the bottom line by several hundred thousand a year. Second, the further rate upside: the model now assumes ADR at the £323 floor of the Renovation page tier bands (raised from an earlier £275 that sat below every tier's floor). Convergence to the £354 midpoint would add roughly £22k Y1 → £299k Y5 of additional PBT — cumulatively ~£895k across the five-year horizon, essentially all margin since higher rate on the same room-nights carries no additional cost. Third, the Phase 03 software layers on the Software page — in-suite control panels (£65-160k capex + £15-30k/yr platform licence) and the AI health concierge on the companion app (£40-80k build + £15-30k/yr LLM API opex) — sit outside this five-year horizon by design. Both are sequenced against operational data from Y1-Y2 rather than modelled into launch.

Accommodation assumptions · under the bonnet

Room-nights, ADR and occupancy, line by line.

Added following Ryan LeCouteur's Sep 2026 review: every accommodation line above decomposed into available room-nights × occupancy × ADR, benchmarked against FY2025 actuals so an investor can compare each theoretical projection against a real 2025 rate. This is the working underneath the P&L, not a new set of numbers.

Line	Available room-nights	Assumed ADR (blended)	Occupancy ramp Y1 → Y5	Y1 revenue	Y5 revenue	FY2025 actual (comparable)
Legacy — extranet + tour operator Deliberately exited. Winds down Y1 → Y3.	n/a — winding down	~£85–£100	Wind-down, not a ramp	£570k	£0	£1,434,749
Retained corporate + F.I.T. The channels that survive the repositioning. Reprices upward, fewer nights.	Shares 57-suite pool (~20,805/yr)	FY2025 ~£133 → target ~£320 (repriced to new tier bands)	~13% of pool Y1 → ~11% Y5 (fewer nights at higher rate)	£880k	£800k	£1,069,929 (corporate £342,584 + F.I.T. £727,345)
New market — non-programme (57 Orion suites) Longevity-adjacent leisure travellers, alumni returning on non-clinical stays, companions.	Shares 57-suite pool (~20,805/yr)	£323 (floor of tier bands; £354 midpoint = unmodelled upside)	~3% of pool Y1 → ~37% Y5 (built from zero as marketing lands)	£186k	£2,461k	£0 — built from zero
Programme accommodation (57 Orion suites) Rooms sold as part of Weekend / Pause / Reset / View programme fees. Derived from £867 Y1 → £731 Y5 per-guest accommodation figure × programme guest count.	Shares 57-suite pool (~20,805/yr)	Effective ~£181/night blended (£867 ÷ 4.8 night average) → ~£161 by Y5 (£731 ÷ 4.5 night average)	Ramps with the utilisation sliders above (Modelled default: 22% Y1 → 60% Y5 of 57-suite pool)	Reads live from slider	Reads live from slider	£0 — new revenue stream (programme is new)
South Wing corporate long-stay (15 studios) Revised Sep 2026 following Ryan's pushback on Big 4 demand + Liberty Wharf comparables.	5,475/yr (15 × 365)	£170 blended (front £190, rear £155) was £220	40% → 55% → 65% → 70% → 75% was 60% → 85%	£372k was £722k	£698k was £1,024k	No direct comparable — new use for these rooms. HdF 2025 corporate blended ADR £108.79 (short-stay dominated); Liberty Wharf 28-night winter ~£125/night is the closest comparable.
Artist residency room-nights Artist-lift demand at £323 ADR less £40 marginal servicing (~£283 contribution).	12 nights/residency × 2 Y1 → 6 Y3+ residencies	£323	n/a (fixed nights per residency)	~£7k	~£23k	n/a — new
All-in whole-suite-pool utilisation cross-check	72 suites × 365 = 26,280/yr (57 Orion + 15 studios)	Blended across all lines at ~£265-£290 depending on year and mix			Whole-property occupancy Y5 ~63% — comfortably within peer boutique range (SHA ~60%, Lanserhof ~60-65%)

How to read this table. Every accommodation line in the P&L above is derived from an occupancy × ADR × room-nights calculation with FY2025 actuals as the anchor. The largest structural asks are the new-market non-programme line (£0 → £2.46M) and the programme accommodation line (net-new, ramps with the utilisation sliders) — both defensible on the basis that the property is repositioning to a new market and the reference class is Buchinger Wilhelmi / SHA / Lanserhof, not the pre-renovation Hotel de France. The South Wing corporate long-stay line has been dropped materially (Sep 2026) to reflect post-COVID Big 4 secondment volumes and Jersey serviced-apartment comparable pricing — Ryan's pushback was substantive and the revised numbers stand up to comparison with Liberty Wharf and HdF's own 2025 corporate ADR.

What's still outstanding. Simon to confirm actual current Big 4 Jersey secondment volumes via KPMG contact — if those come back materially different from the assumed post-COVID reduction, corporate line assumptions may need a further revision (in either direction). The revised £170 ADR / 40-75% occupancy ramp is a defensible working assumption in the meantime.

Departmental detail

Ahara and Sama Clinic, on their own account.

The FY2025 accounts already produce a departmental P&L for Food & Beverage — which is how we know La Terrasse and Kitchen turned £1,235,401 of income into a £10,830 loss, with departmental wages at 60% of departmental revenue. These two tables extend that discipline forward and to the clinic. Both are built from the specific positions and salaries on the Staff page rather than from an allocation, so each department can be judged on whether it covers its own costs.

One convention to note. The programme fee is a bundle — clinical work, food and programme coordination are sold as a single price — so attributing it to departments requires internal transfer pricing. Of the £1,888 Y5 blended fee, the split used here is £1,206 clinical (Sama), £300 food and beverage (Ahara), £282 Medilab pass-through, and £100 programme coordination. The weighting reflects cost-plus transfer pricing: the guest buys a clinical programme, and food is delivered internally against a booking they carried no acquisition cost to win, so it is credited at cost plus a margin while the residual stays with the department that owns the proposition. Ayush spa treatments are not part of the bundled fee — programme guests book those separately at retail brochure prices, so Ayush revenue lands directly in the Ayush spa department (see the non-programme spa revenue line above). Accommodation also sits outside the fee. The split above is a modelling assumption and needs management sign-off — it moves profit between departments without changing the whole-hotel result by a penny. Following the FY2025 convention, both tables show departmental profit after directly attributable overhead only; central marketing, group admin and finance are not allocated.

Ahara Restaurant — Kitchen, La Terrasse and Lobby Cafe

Line	FY2025 actual	Year 1	Year 3	Year 5
Non-programme covershotel guests and Jersey walk-ins	£1,210,109	£1,050,000	£1,400,000	£1,750,000
Programme food transferinternal transfer at ~£300/guest on a cost-plus basis — programme guests eat in Ahara on defined schedules, against a booking Ahara carried no acquisition cost to win	—	£87,318	£215,118	£271,800
Lobby Cafe + sundry	£25,292	£80,000	£180,000	£250,000
Total departmental income	£1,235,401	£1,217,318	£1,795,118	£2,271,800
Cost of sales30% on retail covers, plus a fixed ~£150/guest of programme food cost. Programme food cost is held per-guest rather than as a percentage of the transfer price — the guest eats the same food whatever Ahara is credited, so tying the cost to the transfer would let an internal accounting choice move real cost	(£364,737)	(£382,659)	(£581,559)	(£735,900)
Gross profit	£870,664	£834,659	£1,213,559	£1,535,900
Staff costs22 current positions (Kitchen 9, La Terrasse 13) → 25. Add: Sous Chef Ayurvedic Menu £42k, Sandhana Fermentation & Bakery Lead £40k, Kitchari Kitchen Chef £38k, Sommelier £42k, Nutrition-informed Server Lead £34k. Reduce: 2× F&B Attendant at £28k, reflecting lower cover throughput than La Terrasse. Net +£140k base, +£161k fully loaded on the FY2025 actual	(£813,681)	(£930,000)	(£974,681)	(£974,681)
Staff as % of departmental income	65.9%	76.4%	54.3%	42.9%
Departmental operating costscleaning and department supplies, laundry, entertainment	(£33,073)	(£45,000)	(£50,000)	(£55,000)
Directly attributable overheadrenewal, repairs and departmental admin at ~3.5% of income, per the FY2025 convention	(£34,740)	(£42,606)	(£62,829)	(£79,513)
Departmental profit	(£10,830)	(£182,947)	£126,049	£426,706

Read the staff percentage row, not the profit row. Ahara's problem in FY2025 was never volume — it was that wages ran at 65.9% of departmental income against a 30-35% industry norm. Year 1 makes that worse, at 76.4%, because five new positions land before the covers do. The line only comes right through revenue growth: 54.3% by Year 3, 42.9% by Year 5 — still meaningfully above benchmark. That is the honest read. Ahara becomes profitable in this plan because it sells more, not because it becomes efficient, and a restaurant carrying 41% labour at maturity has no margin for a soft year. Two levers exist if the board wants that ratio inside benchmark: revisit the five additions, or lift covers above the modelled £1.75M. The Sandhana Fermentation & Bakery Lead is the position to interrogate first — it serves the wider Sandhana operation and the retail line, not Ahara covers alone, so a share of that £40k arguably belongs elsewhere.

Sama Clinic

A new division, so there is no FY2025 comparator. Four clinical functions are deliberately outsourced rather than employed and appear as costs, not headcount: Medilab phlebotomy and pathology, imaging beyond DEXA (Elinor Ruth Medical Centre and Jersey X-Ray Services), specialist consultants, and out-of-hours GP cover.

Line	Year 1	Year 3	Year 5
Clinical share of programme feetransfer at ~£900/guest — the four Mati consultations, DEXA, and case-conference time	£261,657	£645,354	£815,400
Focus streamsKanti, Klesha, Manas, Agni, Nidra, Kaya and fasting, plus Focus-only stays. Vikrama Focus excluded — it belongs to Bala Gym	£329,663	£807,507	£1,112,426
Kanti aesthetic — local, non-programmeDr Alexa Kerr's independent practice book, priced separately from programmes	£60,000	£120,000	£150,000
Medilab pass-through£282/guest in, the same out — nets to zero, shown gross for transparency	£83,754	£198,246	£255,492
Total departmental income	£735,074	£1,771,107	£2,333,318
Clinical staff costsMedical Director / GP £90k (Dr Shiv Chande) · Aesthetic Doctor £100k (Dr Alexa Kerr) · Integrative & Functional Medicine £82k (Dr Marie-Christine Dix) · Manas Clinical Psychologist £75k · HCPC Dietitian £60k · Kinesiology / Movement Scientist £50k · DEXA Operator (IR(ME)R-certified, not a full HCPC radiographer — see Equipment page) £27k · Health Coach £42k = £526k base, plus ~15% employer on-costs (£79k) and the £28k locum cover budget = £632,900 fully loaded. Year 1 slightly lower on phased start dates	(£595,000)	(£632,900)	(£632,900)
Medilab pass-through cost	(£83,754)	(£198,246)	(£255,492)
Clinical consumables & suppliesaesthetic product, peels, phlebotomy consumables, PPE — ~12% of Focus and Kanti revenue	(£46,760)	(£111,301)	(£151,491)
Outsourced referralsMRI, CT and X-ray at Elinor Ruth Medical Centre and Jersey X-Ray Services, DEXA overflow above the ~3,300 scans/yr on-site capacity, and specialist consultant referrals	(£25,000)	(£45,000)	(£60,000)
Equipment amortisation + clinical utilities + softwareDEXA, Kanti suite, Kaya rig, Theia3D markerless motion capture, Vald ForceDecks Mini single-plate, AcuPebble, phlebotomy fit-out at £35k, plus the clinical share of electricity. Includes ongoing software subscriptions: Theia3D ~£4k/yr, Vald ForceDecks ~£1k/yr — expensed here rather than amortised.	(£52,000)	(£55,000)	(£55,000)
Directly attributable overheadregistration, indemnity, CPD, renewal and repairs at ~3.5% of income excluding pass-through	(£22,796)	(£55,050)	(£72,724)
Medical Advisory Board — honoraria + hosted meeting3-5 external clinicians at £3-6k/each honorarium × ~4 members = £12-24k/yr, plus one hosted meeting/yr (accommodation + travel + hospitality ~£8-16k). Full MAB scope on the Sama Clinic page Section Ten. Y1 lighter (single meeting + partial-year onboarding); Y2+ steady-state	(£20,000)	(£30,000)	(£30,000)
Departmental profit	(£125,236)	£628,660	£1,060,761

The clinic does cover its own costs — and clears breakeven in Year 2. This answers the constraint set out above directly. Sama runs a £125,236 departmental loss in Year 1, turns positive by Year 2 at £628,660, and reaches £1,060,761 by Year 5. Treatments are priced above the cost of delivering them throughout; the Year 1 loss is not a pricing failure but a volume one. Materially improved from the earlier version of this section on the back of the Medical Director / Aesthetic Doctor salary revisions on the Programmes-page methodology.
Almost the entire cost base is fixed. Of £835k of Year 1 cost, £595,000 is salaried clinicians who must be in post from opening — you cannot run a registered clinical premise with a part-time Medical Director. Only consumables and referrals flex with volume. That is the operating leverage that turns a £100k loss into a £1.10M profit on the same payroll, and it is equally the concentration risk: every guest below plan falls straight through to the departmental result.
Focus streams are the commercial engine, not the programme fee. At Year 5, Focus contributes £1,112,426 against £815,400 from the clinical share of the programme fee — 54% of Sama's non-pass-through revenue comes from Focus attachment. The model assumes attach rates of 15% Kanti, 18% Klesha, 22% Nidra and so on. Those rates matter more to the clinic's viability than headline programme utilisation does, and they are the least evidenced assumption in this section. Worth tracking as a first-order KPI from opening.

Ayush Spa

The 20-year-established Ayush operation on its own account. Two structural changes from FY2025: expansion from 8 to 10 treatment rooms (+25% capacity) landing mid-Year 2, and a new revenue stream as programme guests now book their Ayurvedic bodywork à la carte at retail brochure prices (previously bundled inside the programme fee at internal transfer cost — see Ayush page for the unbundling rationale). Revenue is anchored on the FY2025 actual of £886,804 (confirmed by Ryan from the Sundry sales code). The wage-bill split still needs Ryan's payroll-by-department detail before the cost line is anchored — the £420k estimate below is directional only.

Line	FY2025 actual	Year 1	Year 3	Year 5
Local + hotel-guest à la carteJersey residents, non-programme hotel guests, Discount Membership, gift vouchers. 8 rooms → 10 rooms mid-Year 2. FY2025 actual sourced from Ryan's Sundry sales code (spa treatments line item). Year 3–5 uplift reflects two additional treatment rooms (mid-Y2) at ~£110k/room-year	£886,804	£887,000	£1,057,000	£1,057,000
Programme guests — à la carte bookingnew post-unbundling: programme guests book their Ayurvedic prescription treatments through the spa at retail rates. Modelled at ~3-4 treatments per programme guest at 60-70% take-up, ~£150 avg	—	£0	£280,000	£550,000
Total departmental incomereconciles to the spa revenue line in the main P&L above	£886,804	£887,000	£1,337,000	£1,607,000
Therapist wagesthe existing ~12-therapist team, growing to ~14-15 as rooms 9 and 10 come online and treatment volume from programme-guest à la carte kicks in. Ryan to confirm the current Ayush wage bill from the £2,644,610 FY2025 salary total (currently estimated at ~£420k blended fully loaded)	~(£420,000)	(£440,000)	(£520,000)	(£560,000)
Staff as % of departmental income	~47%	50%	39%	35%
Consumables & suppliesmedicated oils, herbal powders, laundry (heavy for abhyanga), muslin poultice materials, treatment linens, teas, single-use items — held at ~12% of revenue against typical Ayurvedic spa benchmarks	~(£106,000)	(£106,000)	(£160,000)	(£193,000)
Directly attributable overheadrenewal, repairs, treatment-room utilities and departmental admin at ~3.5% of income, per the FY2025 convention used for Ahara and Sama above	~(£31,000)	(£31,000)	(£47,000)	(£56,000)
Departmental profit	£330,000	£310,000	£610,000	£798,000

Ayush is already a serious contributor, and the unbundling scales it. Ryan's FY2025 actual of £886,804 in spa treatment revenue means the department was already generating ~£330k profit on its own account at a healthy ~47% wage-to-income ratio (against the estimated £420k wage base — Ryan to confirm). Post-unbundling, programme guests booking Ayurvedic treatments at retail brochure prices add a new revenue stream on largely the same wage base: Year 5 departmental profit ~£798k, wage ratio down to 35%. This is a materially stronger baseline than the earlier estimate suggested.
The revenue column is now anchored on Ryan's actuals. The £886,804 FY2025 spa treatments figure comes directly from the Sundry sales ledger code (not a derived estimate as previously). Wage-cost anchoring is the remaining diligence item — Ryan's payroll-by-department split will replace the £420k blended estimate, at which point the departmental profit line becomes fully sourced rather than partially derived.
The 8→10 room expansion is the operating leverage. Two additional treatment rooms coming online mid-Year 2 lift capacity by 25% without a proportional wage increase — the existing 12-therapist team plus 2-3 new hires can staff 10 rooms comfortably. Same shape as Ahara: profitability improves through volume against a semi-fixed cost base, and every guest above plan flows to the departmental result at ~£100 marginal contribution per treatment.

Realism check

How achievable are these guest numbers?

The default utilisation curve — 40% Y1, ramping to 62% Y5 — is the heartbeat of every contribution figure on this page. That curve has two components: an unshifted base at 22% Y1 growing to 60% Y5, plus the combined uplift from the pre-launch campaign, the ten-week soft launch, and the artist-in-residence programme — all three toggled on by default because they represent the plan we would actually run. Y5 62% is deliberately peer-median — SHA Wellness ~60%, Lanserhof Tegernsee 60-65%, Palazzo Fiuggi 50-55% — rather than aspirational. A board reviewing the model is right to ask whether these numbers are genuinely achievable. This section pressure-tests the curve honestly, names the execution dependencies it relies on, and offers a more conservative alternative for stress-testing.

Year by year, what each number assumes.

Year 1 at 40% utilisation (541 programme guests). Made up of a 22% unshifted base plus +12pp from the pre-launch campaign, +5pp from the soft launch, and +1pp from the artist-in-residence programme (2 Y1 residencies × ~5 additional programme guests drawn by each artist's audience). The 22% base is defensible without any lever pulled — it is what the Ayush list, PR engagement and paid social should deliver at existing budgets. The 18pp of stacked uplift is what the three demand-side investments buy: Lanserhof Tegernsee opened at 35-40% on thirty years of Lanserhof Sylt brand carry, and 40% is deliberately calibrated to sit at the top of that comparable range — the pre-launch campaign exists precisely to substitute for the parent-brand awareness we don't have. Soft launch adds 5pp through alumni rebooking, referrals and content produced during the 10-week rehearsal; residencies add 1pp through advance advertising to each artist's audience.

Toggling both levers off returns Y1 to 22% (297 guests) — the unshifted base — and the Realism check reads differently at that level: still defensible, but genuinely on the optimistic side of defensible for a launch with no brand carry, since a 15-18% opening is the more cautious read of comparable launches without a parent brand.

Year 2 at 50% utilisation (676 programme guests). A +10pp lift on Y1 — comprising +10pp pre-launch carry (awareness compounding, waitlist conversions arriving) plus +3pp soft-launch carry (returning alumni, referrals maturing) plus +1pp residency (4 Y2 residencies), against a moderated organic ramp from the peer-aligned base curve. Industry pace for Y1→Y2 in premium-clinical hospitality typically runs +10-15pp, so the model sits mid-range for a launch with both levers running. The lift depends on Y1 execution being strong rather than merely adequate — this remains the year that requires the most attention.

Year 3 at 55% utilisation (744 programme guests). A +5pp jump. By Y3 the brand should be generating meaningful organic demand, and the marketing budget tapers reflecting that (£260k Y1 → £150k Y3 per the current Marketing page). Pre-launch residual uplift falls to +5pp, soft-launch residual to +1pp, residency lift settles at +2pp (steady-state 6 residencies from Y3 onwards) — the balance of the growth comes from a maturing organic funnel against a peer-median mature-year landing spot rather than a stretch target.

Year 4-5 at 59-62% utilisation (798-838 programme guests). Steady-state for a mature premium-clinical hotel, deliberately landed at peer median rather than aspirational. Pre-launch uplift residuals taper to +2pp at Y4 and zero by Y5; residency lift settles at +2pp Y3-Y5 with 6 residencies/year. Lanserhof Tegernsee runs at 60-65% mature, SHA Wellness ~60%, Palazzo Fiuggi 50-55% — The Long Hotel's 62% sits comfortably inside that band. Defensible at maturity without brand carry the peer set had.

The execution dependencies behind the base case.

Six things have to land for the default curve to hold. None individually catastrophic if it slips, but cumulatively they are the difference between hitting the modelled trajectory and falling 20-30% behind it.

The £300k Year 0 pre-launch campaign actually delivers its modelled uplift. A twelve-month runway of PR, waitlist-building, editorial, partnership pipelines and content seeded before opening — designed to open the doors with a booking book rather than empty diaries. The +12pp Y1 / +10pp Y2 / +5pp Y3 / +2pp Y4 assumption reflects Lanserhof-comparable openings that had brand carry. If the campaign lands editorial and pipeline but not enough conversion, the uplift compresses toward the lower end of that range.
The ten-week soft launch produces real alumni and referrals. Discounted stays for Jersey locals and friends-and-family in the ten weeks before public opening, with structured feedback and testimonial capture. The +5pp Y1 / +3pp Y2 / +1pp Y3 assumption depends on genuine repeat and referral behaviour from the soft-launch cohort, not just publicity value.
Ayush list activation hitting 5% conversion. The Ayush list is the single most commercially important owned channel — zero marketing spend, ~100 bookings projected at 5% conversion of an estimated 2,000 active contacts. If conversion lands at 3% instead of 5%, Y1 loses 40 bookings (roughly -3pp Y1 utilisation).
Editorial coverage delivering at projected reach. Six placements at >2m reach is the Y1 PR target. Coverage that lands but in lower-reach outlets, or fewer placements at higher reach, has compounding effects across Y2 and Y3.
The Long Reset (flagship) capturing the projected ~40% of programme bookings. Tier mix matters more than headline utilisation — the Long Reset is the highest-margin tier, and a mix shift toward Weekend/Pause (lower-margin, shorter stays) hits contribution disproportionately.
The bloodwork commitment converting at the bookings stage. The bloodwork is the structural differentiator for the proposition (see the Market page). The forecast assumes its presence helps marketing efficiency at given spend rather than requiring more spend. If the bloodwork story does not differentiate cleanly in the buyer's mind, paid social CAC trends higher than modelled.

The prudent alternative scenario.

If the default case represents what the venture can achieve with strong execution across all six dependencies above — including the two demand-side campaigns landing their modelled uplifts — a prudent alternative case is what the venture can plausibly deliver with the pre-launch and soft-launch levers running but under-delivering, and with the other dependencies landing at adequate rather than strong. It looks roughly like this. Note that the Discount Membership contribution is small in absolute terms across both cases (£23k Y1 rising to £94k Y5 at the modelled member growth) and is not the driver of the difference between scenarios; residential utilisation is.

Year	Default (levers on)	Prudent case	Difference
Y1 utilisation	40% (541 guests)	27% (365 guests)	-176 guests
Y2 utilisation	50% (676 guests)	37% (500 guests)	-176 guests
Y3 utilisation	55% (744 guests)	45% (608 guests)	-136 guests
Y4 utilisation	59% (798 guests)	50% (676 guests)	-122 guests
Y5 utilisation	62% (838 guests)	55% (744 guests)	-94 guests
5-year combined cumulative contribution residential programme + Discount Membership	Live from sliders above	~15% lower than default at the pessimistic slider position	—

The prudent case still delivers a venture that generates meaningful net contribution across the five-year horizon — but it is the case the venture should commit to delivering rather than the case it should commit to achieving. The default is the target if all six execution dependencies above land cleanly; the prudent case is what the operating team should plan, hire, and budget against.

For board purposes, both figures are useful. The default shows what a well-executed launch with the marketing levers pulled looks like — it is deliberately peer-median in absolute terms (62% steady-state utilisation sits between Lanserhof Tegernsee ~60-65%, SHA ~60%, and Palazzo Fiuggi ~50-55%), and the ramp is achievable because the levers are running. The prudent case shows what survives if execution is uneven — Y5 55% is meaningfully below peer median. The exact cumulative contribution figures under either scenario read live from the interactive table above; the Pessimistic preset button applies a stricter version of the prudent case in one click.

A note on what the sliders show. The interactive forecast above includes a built-in "Pessimistic" preset that captures the prudent case directionally. Drag the sliders — or click the preset — to see the default figures recompute against a more conservative trajectory. The model produces honest live numbers under any utilisation assumption the reader chooses; it does not hide the downside. Toggling the pre-launch or soft-launch levers off returns the sliders to the unshifted base curve so you can see the pure organic case.

Download the full working file

Every number on this proposal, in one spreadsheet.

The Excel workbook mirrors the entire proposal in a single file. The Forecast tab carries a scenario dropdown that swaps between Modelled, Pessimistic, Optimistic and AI downturn — the P&L recalculates live. The 2025 Actuals tab holds Ryan's FY2025 aggregate-code breakdown as the reference baseline the forecast projects from. Each of the four longevity programmes (Weekend, Pause, Reset, View) and eight Focus programmes (Kanti, Nidra, Klesha, Manas, Kaya, Vikrama, Agni, Upavasa) sits on its own tab with the itemised delivery-cost breakdown and margin math. Renovation and Equipment carry every line item from the corresponding pages. The Investment tab is last, with the capital structure, itemised Parker cash sources (Westview, Guernsey tranches, Turkey, The Lodge, ongoing) and Y5 return scenarios.

Download the workbook (.xlsx)

17 tabs · scenario dropdown drives the Forecast · all figures editable